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AbstrAct
Dunbar’s social brain hypothesis constitutes an 
influential position among those that relate the evolution 
of human cognition and sociality. In this work, we first 
present the essentials of the theory and discuss the 
paleoanthropological and social evidence claimed to 
support it. We also point out its shortcomings, which 
have to do with the general strategy of finding linear 
relations among different traits, the lack of attention to the 
mental capacities that make human social life possible, 
and the diversity of social relations and structures that 
take place. We put forward our way of complementing 
Dunbar’s approach by focusing on the role of trust in 
cementing society and explaining diversity.
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resumen
La hipótesis del cerebro social de Dunbar constituye una 
posición influyente entre aquellas que relacionan la evolu-
ción de la cognición y la socialidad humanas. En este tra-
bajo, tras presentar los puntos esenciales de su teoría, 
discutimos las evidencias paleo-antropológicas y sociales 
en las que se sustenta. También señalamos algunas limi-
taciones. Tales limitaciones tienen que ver con la estrate-
gia general de buscar relaciones lineales entre diferentes 
rasgos, la insuficiente atención a las capacidades men-
tales que hacen posible la vida social humana, y a la diver-
sidad de las estructuras sociales efectivas. Presentamos 
nuestra forma de complementar el enfoque de Dunbar al 
centrarnos en el papel que juega la confianza como ce-
mento de la sociedad y para explicar la diversidad
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IntroductIon
Following Humphrey’s suggestion in “The social 
function of the intellect” (Humphrey 1976), diverse 
theoretical proposals have developed the hypothe-
sis of the existence of a crucial relation between 
human cognition and sociality from an evolutio-
nary point of view. For example, the Machiavellian 
Intelligence Hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten 1988) 
or the Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis (Moll and 
Tomasello 2007) coincide in trying to explain the 
existence of certain cognitive capacities in humans 
—such as to detect lies or to establish cooperative 
plans— in terms of their evolutionary function, as 
adaptive solutions to the selective pressures derived 
from the increasing complexity characterizing social 
life throughout the Hominin lineage. It is important 
to note the dual explanatory link between cognition 
and sociality involved in these proposals: on the one 
hand, certain cognitive abilities are required to exhibit 
relevant social behaviors; and on the other hand, the-
se cognitive abilities are thought to have evolved be-
cause the social behaviors they enabled were adap-
tive. An evolutionary account of the mind involves an 
account of sociality, and vice versa.
This dual explanatory link turns out to be even more 
intricate when we consider one of the most influential 
programs that relates the cognitive and social evolu-
tion of our species: Dunbar’s Social Brain Hypothesis 
(SBH) (Dunbar 2010; Dunbar and Shultz 2007; Shultz 
and Dunbar 2007; Dunbar 1998; Dunbar 1992).The 
hypothesis states that our brain is an adaptation to 
our social life, so instead of singling out the cognitive 
functions required for our kind of social life, Dunbar 
focuses on the brain that supports those functions. 
The idea consists of indicating the interdependence 
between the type of social life that characterizes hu-
mans and the neural requisites necessary to sustain 
the mental functions that make this type of sociality 
possible. It is also assumed that this brain evolved 
—by basically increasing its relative size— because 
of the adaptive advantages derived from the social 
organization it made possible. It is assumed that this 
is the right level of explanation, overlooking the fact 
that the same brain is involved in a diversity of human 
societies. In other words, social diversity is kept out of 
the picture; it is just assumed that it must be constrai-
ned by the evolved human social brain.
Undoubtedly, there are advantages in the formu-
lation of the evolutionary hypothesis in terms of an 
increase in brain size instead of particular cognitive 
functions. From the point of view of the hominization 
process, the increase in relative brain size is an in-
disputable fact. However, from an evolutionary point 
of view, this increase also involved higher metabo-
lic costs, such as higher energy consumption, risk 
of overheating, or greater demands for the heart to 
pump blood. The SBH stresses the adaptive advan-
tages of this brain enlargement in terms of the be-
nefits of complex social life, in the sense that brains 
had to be larger than the biological costs. A diversity 
of evidence is brought to support it. Thus, for instan-
ce, comparative studies of several species in diffe-
rent evolutionary conditions are required to establish 
both homologies within our own lineage and conver-
gences with other taxa to consider whether or not a 
relation between larger brains and social complexi-
ty can be established. Similarly, paleontological and 
anthropological data about our ancestors can help 
establish universal constraints in social complexity 
among the diversity of human cultures. In particular, 
the SBH predicts that the human brain sets a limit on 
the scope and quality of human social relationships. 
In this work, we review these different lines of evi-
dence to assess in which way and to which extent 
Dunbar’s SBH is well supported. In our opinion, the 
weak points of this proposal come from the need to 
go beyond a too simple initial proposal based on a co-
rrelational methodology, which requires seeking sim-
ple linear relations, and overlooks the possibility of 
complex interactions among multiple factors. These 
weaknesses are evident precisely in the ambiguity 
indicated between the assumed original social con-
figuration and his claim that it still holds through the 
diversity of human societies. An articulated view of 
the cognitive mechanisms needed for a human social 
life in its diversity is also required, just as attention 
to the diversity of social relations is also due. In our 
view, it is in this way that human universals can be 
found, rather than in terms of maximum size of social 
groups, as Dunbar contends. In fact, it seems that in 
his more recent work, which focuses on trust-based 
groups, Dunbar is currently developing the SBH pre-
cisely in this direction. We will propose how trust can 
provide the key to better articulate his position.
the relAtIon between relAtIve brAIn sIze And 
grouP sIze
One of the most clear anatomical features of the ho-
minization process is the increase in brain size relative 
to body size; a process that started with the primates. 
In primates, it seems that the relative increase in brain 
size takes place especially in the telencephalon: the 
neocortex occupies between 50% and 80% of the en-
tire cerebral volume depending on the species. A great 
number of authors have emphasized the problems of 
survival in a new ecological environment as the key 
to such a process. The ecological hypothesis (EH) 
posits that the selective pressures that our ancestors 
had to confront, given the available resources in the 
savanna, and the absence of “weapons” (claws, cani-
ne teeth, etc.) and brute force favored a bigger brain, 
assuming that intelligence depends on (relative) brain 
size. The SBH, on the contrary, views this increase 
primarily as a way of making it possible to live in larger 
groups, which is thought to be advantageous in the 
new environment. Therefore, both theories relate en-
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vironmental pressure and bigger brains; the difference 
between the SBH and the EH lies in the fact that the 
EH views such a brain increase as an individual stra-
tegy, whereas the SBH views it as allowing a more 
complex social organization, which in turn, gave rise to 
new demands. SBH, though, is neutral on whether the 
new social conditions that come with bigger groups 
favor more cooperation (“Vygotskian intelligence”) or 
competition (“Machiavellian intelligence”), because it 
is group size per se, and not the kind of relationships 
within the group, that is related to such an increase in 
relative brain size.
As evidence against the EH, Dunbar quotes the 
McNab and Eisenberg (1989) study, which showed 
that relative brain size in mammals correlates more 
clearly with their daily routines than with their meta-
bolic ratio (the amount of energy liberated per unit of 
time). Dunbar (1998, 2003) also examined a possible 
correlation in primates between the increase in relati-
ve volume of the neocortex (neocortex volume com-
pared to total brain volume) and ecological indicators 
such as the proportion of consumed fruit in diet and 
the foraging style (Fig. 1) or the length of daily displa-
cements, but found none. 
On the contrary, the relative size of the neocortex 
correlates with group size in anthropoids (Kudo and 
Dunbar 2001; Dunbar 1992; 1995) as predicted by 
SBH (Fig. 2). However, when the same variables 
were compared in other mammals, such as bats, 
artiodactyls ungulates and carnivores, and 135 spe-
cies of birds, the pattern turned out to be more nuan-
ced: beyond group size, it is the type of relationships 
among group members that matters most. Thus, spe-
cies organized in stable couples have bigger relative 
brains than those living a solitary life or in multi-male 
groups (Shultz and Dunbar 2007).
Therefore, the evidence suggests that group size 
is not all there is to bigger brains: the complexity of 
the social relationships involved also seems to play a 
role. Support for the SBH is only modest. An analysis 
of the characteristics of social life, beyond group size, 
seems to be in order. In recent work, Dunbar has 
become aware of this, as we will see in the Section 
“Enlarged neocortex and social life”. 
costs And benefIts of lIfe In comPlex grouPs
Even in the case of primates, where the corre-
lation between bigger group size and higher brain 
ratio holds, the question of the costs and benefits of 
social life needs to be addressed. Group size might 
be a mere by-product of developing bigger brains for 
some other reason. Hill and Dunbar (1998), Dunbar 
(1988) and Van Schaik (1983) found support for the 
idea that the increase in the brain’s ratio is the key 
to bigger groups, which would be advantageous 
in the new ecological conditions of our ancestors. 
More specifically, Dunbar (2003) argued that bigger 
groups cannot be a by-product of bigger brains be-
cause of the costs of living in society: group living 
is so demanding that it constitutes an evolutionary 
pressure per se, so that if advantages were not 
superior to costs, the group would disperse. In his 
opinion, the advantages of group living include di-
minishing predation risks, improving territory defen-
se, and sharing the breeding of progeny. As for the 
costs of living in bigger groups, they involve compe-
tition for scarce resources and sexual partners, con-
flicts among the group members, and, in general, 
the need to solve coordination problems. Therefore, 
the larger the group, the higher the costs of keeping 
the group together, both in terms of time spent and 
behaviors addressed to avoid conflicts. 
Figure 1.
Relative neocortex size in the anthropoid primates compared to (a) percentage of fruit in diet and (b) types of 
extractive foraging. In none of the two cases a correlation is found (taken from Dunbar 1998, p.183).
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From this point of view, Dunbar (1991) describes 
the important role of mutual grooming to create ties 
and to maintain group cohesion in primates. This so-
cial activity cannot exceed approximately 20% of daily 
time so that other vital activities can be attended to, 
although the estimation might change among species 
depending on their different life patterns, habits, social 
system, predatory pressure, habitat resources, and 
others. No further precision is provided in this regard.
However, Lehmann, Korstjens, and Dunbar (2007) 
did not find a correlation between group size and mu-
tual grooming in primates: at a certain level, grooming 
cannot be the only way of maintaining cohesion. In 
addition to mutual grooming, other activities, such as 
games, courtship and mating, agonistic interactions, 
and territorial behavior, also play a role in maintaining 
social cohesion (Dunbar 1991). All these activities re-
quire a great investment of time and effort, as well as 
specific cognitive capacities, such as remembering 
who groomed whom before, with whom one fought, 
who is allied with whom, and who helps whom in 
case of conflict. For this reason, instability and group 
division are to be expected when time to invest and 
cognitive abilities needed to maintain social ties ex-
ceed certain limits. 
Dunbar’s argument can now be formulated this 
way: brains evolved for social life because group size 
depends on the cognitive resources and the time 
available to keep the group together. From this point 
of view, a further increase in relative neocortex size in 
the Hominin lineage, and the superior cognitive abi-
lities that followed, made it possible to preserve co-
hesion more effectively in the available time, thereby 
allowing bigger groups. 
Nevertheless, this evidence is not enough to support 
the SBH idea that an increase in group size leads to 
the increase in relative brain size, particularly the neo-
cortex. For the SBH, the benefits of increased social 
activity put a premium on an increase in neocortex vo-
lume because superior cognitive skills are needed as 
a more efficient way to maintain social cohesion, ma-
nage bigger groups, and expand the lineage. However, 
the SBH falls short when attempting to provide a cau-
sal explanation of the process: we are not given a clue 
as to its starting point, nor a reason why other species, 
which might have also benefited from a complex so-
cial life, failed to do so. The SBH is also deficient as a 
functional account: living in groups as large as human 
ones can be achieved without following the “bigger 
brains” strategy —as long as the relationships among 
members are kept simple. Therefore, the previous criti-
cal remark also applies here: what really matters in this 
process is not so much group size per se as social re-
lations and social structure, since the cognitive way of 
maintaining social cohesion, in fact, concerns the type 
of relationships among group members that it makes 
possible. In bigger groups, hierarchies and coalitions, 
family structure, and social roles become more com-
plex, giving rise to new forms of social cohesion. 
enlArged neocortex And socIAl lIfe
In recent years, Dunbar has increasingly recogni-
zed that the question of the type of social relationships 
deserves greater attention. An effort in this direction is 
the work of Shultz and Dunbar (2007): they focus on 
the connection between relative brain size and type 
of social relationships by analyzing the different re-
lationships among individuals within the group. Their 
hypothesis contends that different types of social re-
lationships involve different cognitive demands, which 
in turn will require different relative brain sizes. They 
reason that long-term bonds, such as couples, requi-
re higher cognitive resources, because longer ties 
involve keeping track of and managing the inevitable 
conflicts that arise regarding access to resources, pa-
rental investment, and time budget. To maintain such 
a relationship, individuals need skills to solve such 
conflicts, to influence others’ behavior, to remember 
previous experiences, and make a plan to maximize 
their reproductive success. On the contrary, unstable 
relationships, such as those of multi-male groups, do 
not require these cognitive resources. They are not 
needed to recognize each other. Support for the hy-
pothesis is found in a correlational analysis of different 
groups of animals in terms of relative brain size and 
style of social relationship (Fig. 3).
In fact, in previous work on ungulates, Shultz and 
Dunbar (2006) already suggested that the most favo-
rable conditions for brain enlargement are: a highly 
social way of life, monogamous couplings, and the 
so-called “mixed environments” of neither closed nor 
unlimited habitats (Fig. 4).
Figure 2.
Correlation between the average size of grooming 
clique compared to neocortex average ratio for 
primates and anthropoid monkeys such as L.catta, 
L.fulvus, Propithecus, Indri, S.sciureus, C.apella, 
C.torquatus, A.geoffroyi, A.fusciceps, P.badius, 
P.entellus, P.pileata, P.johnii, C.campbelli, C.diana, 
C.aethiops,C.mitis, E.patas, M.mulatta, M.fuscata, 
M.arctoides, M.sylvana, M.radiata, P.anubis, 
P.ursinus, P.cynocephauls, P.hamadryas, T.gelada, 
P.troglodytes, P.paniscus(Dunbar 1998, p. 186).
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Figure 3.
Relative brain size according to parenting system in (a) carnivores, (b) ungulates, (c) bats, and (d) birds. Stable 
couples are more likely to be found in species with relatively bigger brains (Shultz andDunbar 2007, p. 2432).
Figure 4.
Relation between relative neocortex size and social and ecological factors: (a) sociality, (b) mating strategy, 
and (c) habitat use (Shultz andDunbar 2006, p. 212).
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a positive correlation between volume of gray mat-
ter in the average prefrontal cortex and size of an 
individual’s social network. A similar correlation ap-
pears again in a new analysis of Powell et al. (2012); 
in this case between the orbital volume of the pre-
frontal cortex and social group size. Nevertheless, 
whereas the neocortex is clearly involved in attentio-
nal and behavioral control, it is not the only brain area 
involved in social life; think of memory, for instance, 
which is related to tempo-parietal areas, or emotions, 
which involve the limbic system. Consequently, the 
evidence concerning relative neocortex size falls 
short when providing full support for the SBH becau-
se it fails to account for many other mental functions 
involved in social life. 
Another line of research to support the SBH has 
been to test whether relative neocortex size in pri-
mates correlates more with the juvenile period (when 
social learning is central) than with gestation time 
(Dunbar 1998). Again, the evidence links neocortex 
and learning, but this might be due to brain immaturi-
ty at birth as a side-effect of the erect posture. In any 
case, evolution drove humans to develop their brains 
during a long process of social influence and lear-
ning, which distinguishes them from other species. 
Human ontogenesis is the key of the brain plasticity 
required to learn (Hutchinson et al. 2005).
In summary, we now see how the SBH has to be 
made more precise again. Once the kind of social re-
lationships is taken into account, as well as the diffe-
rent cognitive skills required to sustain them, relative 
neocortex size cannot be the whole story. More im-
portantly, attention to social learning and brain plas-
ticity during ontogenesis involves realizing that they 
play a role in fostering cultural diversity, just as in 
adapting to it. The SBH tries to address this problem 
by looking for social universals originating in a primiti-
ve social structure and attempts to generalize it. 
unIversAl constrAInts In humAn socIAl lIfe
From the initial connection between brain and 
sociality, Dunbar is driven to consider the question 
of universal constraints in humans’ social life. Such 
constraints are conceived by Dunbar in terms of the 
time required and the limited cognitive resources 
available to establish and maintain the different types 
of human social relationships. While socio-economic 
and marital status, age, education, or the family con-
figuration are factors known to influence the creation 
and structure of social networks (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin and Brashears 2006), Dunbar and colleagues 
suggest the following: 
Number and type of relationships
The first of these constraints is the famous 
Dunbar’s number (Dunbar 1993), which indica-
tes the maximum number of social relationships 
Nevertheless, primates are different. In contrast to 
other taxa, primates show a clear correlation between 
group size and relative brain size (specifically, neo-
cortex ratio with respect to body size). Indeed, this is 
the most important correlation, over and above other 
ones such as social system, mating strategy, or habi-
tat use. Primates are also special because they show 
strong ties among individuals. In particular, anthro-
poid primates live in large social groups with stable 
relationships often based on matrilineal or patrilineal 
kinship, coalitions, and affiliative relationships esta-
blished and maintained through grooming between 
individuals not genetically related. Primates establish 
intense and focused relationships with other group 
members. In other taxa, these relationships only exist 
between reproductive couples. Moreover, in contrast 
to other taxa, the harem and the multi-male social 
systems also correlate with larger relative cerebral 
sizes in primates (Shultz and Dunbar 2007) (Fig. 5).
Figure 5.
Relative brain size according to the social system in 
primates (Dunbar 2007, p. 2432).
These findings suggest the relevance of the neo-
cortex in sustaining primates’ social life, as the SBH 
predicts. Croney and Newberry’s (2007) results also 
support the SBH by suggesting that longer coexis-
tence among the group members fosters cognitive 
development in order to be able to recognize other in-
dividuals, coordinate strategies of survival and domi-
nation, exchange and transmit information within the 
group, improve social attention, use deception tac-
tics, manipulate and compete, and so on. This is also 
in line with Fletcher et al. (1995) who, using PET ima-
ging, found higher activity in prefrontal areas when 
primates recognized and interpreted visual signs and 
emotional states in other individuals, as well as when 
identifying behaviors, manipulating and processing 
information. Likewise, Byrne (1995) also found that 
relative neocortex size correlates with frequency of 
tactical deception in primates.
Even more to the point, recent neuroimaging stu-
dies, such as that of Lewis et al. (2011), have found 
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humans can keep: approximately 150. This num-
ber comes from the observation of different hu-
man groups that maintained stable relations over 
history, in addition to extrapolation from relative 
neocortex size to group size in different species. 
Similarly, Hill and Dunbar (2003) suggested a limit 
to the number of relations established by univer-
sal cognitive constraints derived from the human 
way of maintaining social cohesion, which requires 
face-to-face interaction and individualized pursuit. 
Nevertheless, Dunbar finally realizes that what 
matters is not the number per se but the type of 
relationships. 
In this regard, Roberts et al. (2009) found a ge-
neral pattern in the structure of human social net-
works in contemporary societies. They identified 
three circles of social relationships: i) the “support 
clique”, which consists of around 5 emotionally clo-
se individuals who receive and provide help or advi-
ce in difficult times; ii) the “sympathy group”, which 
is a group of friends with at least a monthly contact 
and includes an average of 12 to 15 people; and iii) 
the rest of individuals with whom one keeps spora-
dic contact. Accordingly, Roberts et al. (2009) view 
the most sporadic relationships as a form of social 
capital, as an investment in social relationships 
from which a future benefit is expected (Lin 1999). 
These types of relationships imply different levels 
of emotionality (Roberts and Dunbar 2010), which 
determine different costs of maintenance, in terms 
of both time and mental resources. In addition to 
the former groups, they also identify groups of bet-
ween 30 and 50 individuals (bands), those of 500 
individuals (mega-bands), and groups of between 
1,000 and 2,000 members (tribes). Again, these di-
fferent group sizes are supposed to be universal 
patterns across human social diversity, which are 
supposedly derived from, and constrained by, the 
initial hominin structure.
This approach, however, still overlooks the diversi-
ty of human societies. On the one hand, participants 
in the  studies in support of these supposed universal 
group sizes (Roberts et al. 2008; Roberts et al. 2009; 
Roberts and Dunbar 2010) all belong to a cultural and 
socio-economic sample highly restricted to economi-
cally developed European countries (UK students, 
Belgian participants, or English residents of a rural 
community). On the other hand, it is still guided by 
the search for fixed numbers at each level. But what 
if a group of 100 members is found? In fact, the ex-
tensive families of traditional societies have no place 
in Dunbar’s typology. Even more, it is assumed that 
each group size encompasses several groups one 
degree below, but again, without proper justification.
These possibilities cannot be excluded, particu-
larly if the theory contends to apply to current socie-
ties. Nowadays, humans live in broader societies, 
and many researchers analyze the current globaliza-
tion phenomenon and the new social configurations 
it gives rise to. Therefore, a better way to look for 
universals in social structure is to try to understand 
the cognitive resources and emotional motivations 
for social life, and how they give rise, in different 
ecological contexts, to different social relations and 
structures. From this point of view, Dunbar’s num-
ber and his view of universal social circles of a fixed 
size (Roberts et al. 2009) miss the point. A more so-
lid ground in the search for social universals can be 
found in the basic human need for affiliation and our 
prosocial motivations. The idea is that effective social 
configuration is structured around small groups of 
closely attached individuals whose number depends 
on cognitive and time resources, but which can vary 
depending on the ecological pressures.
Cognitive and time requirements to maintain social 
relationships
Maintaining each type of social bond demands 
different cognitive requisites and time investment. 
Close ties are those that involve emotional char-
ge, but they can be of different types. According to 
Roberts et al. (2009), ties with relatives demand less 
dedication in terms of time than other relationships 
because of the combination of the obligation to help 
kin and their high level of structural embeddedness. 
Non-kin close bonds, however, imply more dedication 
to maintain the relationship through frequent commu-
nication in real-time by phone or especially face-to-
face (Mok, Wellman and Basu 2007; Utz 2007). The 
longer time required to create and maintain these 
ties limits their number, thus establishing an upper 
limit of non-kin close ties. Accordingly, the other rela-
tionships are weaker and less emotionally close, and 
therefore also need less personal dedication. As a re-
sult, this latter kind of relationship can be maintained 
with a greater number of individuals due the smaller 
time investment required.
For humans and primates, Zhou et al. (2005) 
also established a fixed numerical sequence in the 
social relationship types of between 3 to 5 relation-
ships (support group), 9 to 15 (sympathy group), 
and 30 to 50 individuals (typical bands of hunters-
gatherers that are more unstable but a part of the 
150 group members). This sequence coincides with 
a stable scale of around 3, which increases geome-
trically and is thought to be universal. According to 
Dunbar, this sequence in the hierarchy of social clo-
seness is related to the above-mentioned cognitive 
limitations because when such limitations are ex-
ceeded, the stability of the relationships diminishes 
and the group divides. In the same sense, Stiller 
and Dunbar (2007) hypothesized which cognitive 
essentials limit in number the relationships of each 
kind supported simultaneously. Thus, they single 
out the theory of mind and memory as the key to the 
support group size due to the cognitive limitations 
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it involves. Accordingly, the theory of mind fixes a 
cognitive limitation in the number of intentionality 
levels that humans can attribute to others (“John 
believes that Peter thinks that Mary wants that 
Frank…) (Kinderman, Dunbar and Bentall 1998). 
Stiller and Dunbar (2007) think that humans fail 
when attempting to retain more than 5 intentionality 
levels, and this number corresponds to the support 
group size. Similarly, short-term memory is limited 
to 5 (the current value of Miller’s [1956] famous 
number 7+/-2). Memory capacity is needed to re-
tain information about these relationships (Barrett, 
Henzi and Dunbar 2003).
On the other hand, Roberts et al. (2008) also analy-
zed personality influences in social relationships, but 
they scarcely found any influence. They only found 
a small effect of extroversion in support groups, right 
at the time of creating new relationships, when indivi-
duals face different life circumstances, or change their 
place of residence. But they did not find any influence 
of neuroticism. Therefore, they concluded that it is the 
cognitive level that matters for social bonding.
Similarly, according to Dunbar (1993), language 
presumes a cognitive skill that is very closely rela-
ted to social activity, which facilitates and multiplies 
social complexity and is parallel to neocortex de-
velopment. Language serves as a substitute in hu-
mans to mutual grooming in primates, multiplying by 
2.8 its possibilities of maintaining relationships over 
grooming. Cohen (1971) also found human cognitive 
limitations in language when he established a maxi-
mum number of 5 persons with whom it is possible 
to have a conversation at a normal voice level. This 
affirmation reinforces Dunbar’s (1993) idea of cogni-
tive limitations to maintaining cohesive groups. When 
this number is exceeded, the conversation groups di-
vide because attention and listening capacities drop 
(Henzi et al. 2007). 
Human conversations traits are analyzed to verify 
whether language origin was related to the creation 
of social bonds (Dunbar, Marriott and Duncan 1997). 
In this respect, Dunbar (1993) concluded that 60% 
of human conversations consist of social gossip. 
Similarly, other experiments on social information 
transmission have found that social gossip is trans-
mitted more frequently than other social topics or any 
other issues (Mesoudi, Whiten and Dunbar 2006) 
(Fig. 6).
Figure 6.
Total number of propositions remembered in every transmission, independently of their precision 
(Mesoudi et al. 2006, p. 412).
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Dunbar, Marriott, and Duncan (1997) also sugges-
ted that most informal conversations usually refer both 
to one’s own personal issues and other people’s and 
they are mere social activities. These studies provide 
support for the SBH by emphasizing social influence 
in a cognitive skill such as language, which, according 
to Dunbar (2009b), requires a sophisticated capacity 
for intentional attribution. Nevertheless, the previous 
gossip percentage constitutes a weak argument to 
extrapolate the social origin of human language, as 
it comes from a study based on a limited number 
of participants who live together in a very concrete 
social context. Another example of the simple linear 
relations is used by Dunbar to support the SBH. In 
fact, Freeberg, Dunbar, and Ord (2012) have recently 
begun to refer to the Social Complexity Hypothesis to 
explain the communication-to-language step in more 
complex social contexts. In a similar sense, Henzi et 
al. (2007) have tried to link meta-representational ca-
pacity with social group size. Nevertheless, all these 
arguments that attempt to identify cognitive mecha-
nisms as possible limitations to certain social practi-
ces are insufficient to support the SBH on their own; 
they just provide circumstantial evidence. 
Although Dunbar’s classification of relationship ty-
pes is interesting, he does not consider the next logi-
cal step: whether the structure of human social net-
works is also conditioned by basic human needs or by 
the social practices themselves. From this standpoint, 
an anthropological perspective on social practices 
and culture is in order to understand how social net-
works are configured by means of cultural resources 
as identities, symbology, beliefs, norms, and techno-
logy. Dunbar concentrates exclusively on interperso-
nal relationships, but the SBH should also consider 
other forms of social relationships (intra-group vs. 
inter-group, for example, or other social psychology 
phenomena) that involve the individual’s identifica-
tion with a generic group. This type of considerations 
leads us to view with some skepticism the recent line 
of development of the SBH regarding the influence of 
Internet on social relationships. Dunbar and collabo-
rators have tried to demonstrate the same type of so-
cial groups in the new virtual social networks (Dunbar 
2012b), but they must resort to analogies that over-
look the different nature of virtual relationships.
In other words, a better way to develop Dunbar’s 
program, in our view, requires attention to the human 
need for social bonding. It is this social motivation 
which is basic, universal, and drives humans to form 
social groups of a small size. Becoming an ultra-social 
species is not just a matter of group membership, but 
of affiliation. The key to understanding the evolution of 
our species is not so much that bigger brains allowed 
for bigger groups, but that a new pattern of attachment 
appeared, one dependent on cognitive resources and 
time investment, but which is emotional in nature. The 
basic “support group” seems to be enough to cover the 
most basic human needs for help, cooperation, affec-
tivity, and safety, especially in difficult times. These 
bonds are reinforced by a stronger emotional load 
which, in turn, promotes greater involvement. Besides, 
the creation of broader and less emotional networks 
might serve another type of social needs that require 
lower implication, possibly for weaker relationships. 
Both personal and general trust seems to play a 
key role in this respect (Acedo-Carmona and Gomila 
2014). Dunbar seems to have realized the need 
to consider the role of trust in social cooperation 
(Sutcliffe et al. 2011). In a way, this amounts to an 
implicit recognition that his previous model was too 
simple. In the same sense, Dunbar (2012a) began 
to use other elements in his explanation of the SBH, 
such as the relevance of laughing and its relation to 
endorphins, as a possible useful mechanism to share 
social activity. Instead of a strict compartmentalization 
of kinds of groups, cognitive and temporal resources, 
and social relations as a way to finding universals 
in social and cognitive evolution, the suggested ap-
proach turns to the evolutionary appearance of a new 
form of social bonding as the trigger of the neural, 
cognitive, and social changes that followed. 
reconstructIon of humAn PhylogenesIs
Another goal of the SBH is to offer the grounds for 
a reconstruction of the hominization process. To this 
extent, it tries to interpolate the social characteristics 
of the fossil species of our hominin lineage from the 
consideration of living species, namely anthropoid 
monkeys and modern humans. The proposal has 
moved from a first phase grounded in group size and 
relative neocortex size —which, as we have already 
indicated repeatedly, turns out to be too simplistic— 
to a more recent and complex proposal.
Thus, in a first attempt, Aiello and Dunbar (1993) 
used the relation between neocortex volume and 
group size. They estimated the neocortex volume 
of different fossil species from their cranial volume 
using the scale identified by Finlay and Darlington 
(1995). From the estimation of neocortical volumes, 
they inferred the group size of these species, assu-
ming that the correlation initially found between both 
parameters held as well. As a result, Homo erectus 
was singled out as the beginning of the key transition 
towards the greater increase of cerebral volume and 
group size with respect to the great apes (Fig.7).
From previous estimations of group size of di-
fferent species, they inferred the time spent on so-
cial activities needed to maintain group cohesion. 
Assuming that individuals cannot dedicate more than 
30% of their daily time to social activity and still have 
time to attend to the rest of their needs (this percen-
tage might change if more selective pressures are 
considered), they calculated the maximum number of 
individuals that can interact. Thus, knowing the group 
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size of different fossil species and the maximum per-
centage of time to social dedication, they calculated 
the time when language appeared. They concluded 
that language appeared 0.5 million years ago. This 
period coincides with appearance of archaic humans; 
hence, the Neanderthal might already have posses-
sed a social speech, according to Dunbar (2003).
In a new reconsideration of the question, Dunbar 
(2003) inferred that only modern humans and 
Neanderthals are capable of the level 4 of intentionali-
ty (Fig. 8), comparing intentionality levels of “catarrhine 
primates” and their cranial volume. Level 4 is espe-
cially important because, supposedly, it is needed for 
religion or the appearance of symbolic culture. This 
estimation coincides with the available archaeological 
evidence that places language appearance with the 
archaic Homo sapiens.
Nevertheless, basing the whole explanation of the 
hominin evolutionary process on a simplified and not 
entirely validated hypothesis involves some risks that 
imply the very weakness of its conclusions. Although 
fossils reveal the relation between cerebral growth 
and superior cognitive complexity, due to the tech-
nical changes in material culture, the SBH is not the 
only possible hypothesis to account for it. 
Recently, Shultz, Nelson, and Dunbar (2012), af-
ter admitting that group size is not enough to explain 
hominids’ brain evolution, tested their previous works 
and tried to add other factors to their statistical analy-
sis. They added elements such as climate, predatory 
pressures, sociality, and language evolution. The 
analysis again attempted to reject the EH in favor of 
the SBH, although seeking a slightly more complex 
social explanation. They concluded that different for-
ces operate in the brain evolutionary process, with pe-
riods of gradual cerebral growth and moments of pro-
minent evolutionary jumps which coincide neither with 
important climate changes nor in Africa and Europe. 
Undoubtedly, they admit that group size could hardly 
depend on just one variable, and ecological factors 
(available resources, competition level, climate, etc.), 
interactive factors (fertility, sexual ratio, etc.), or even 
social factors (language or norms on reproduction 
and familiar organization) might have something to 
do with this. But the coherent thing to do, after this 
acknowledgement, would be to drop the attempt to 
find a linear relation in this regard.
Figure 7.
Social group size predicted for populations of hominids, including modern humans, using the regression 
equation for the group size on the neocortex ratio (Dunbar, 2003, p. 173).
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conclusIon
the SBH faces a paradoxical situation. On the one 
hand, very little remains of the original formulation 
in terms of the relative proportion of neocortex and 
group size (as Dunbar acknowledged in 2007). On 
the other hand, much of the evidence amassed over 
the years is still valid, but some of the claims deri-
ved from it turn out to be too simplistic. However, the 
SBH still seems to be a program that is on the way to 
providing a satisfactory account of human social and 
psychological evolution.
Certainly, Dunbar seems to be well aware of this 
situation. His more recent papers acknowledge this 
complexity and go beyond the search for simple li-
near correlations. Thus, for example, neurobiologi-
cal analyses of brain areas involved in certain so-
cial aptitudes (Lewis et al. 2011; Dunbar 2010) are 
carried out, just as reviews of their neurochemical 
bases (Machin and Dunbar 2011). Similarly, he is 
also interested in the topology of social networks, 
and not just in group size (Dunbar and Shultz 2007). 
This confirms the simplicity of the previous ver-
sions of the theory based merely on neocortex size. 
Nevertheless, adding complexity to the SBH formu-
lation entails calling into question some of its core 
assumptions, such as the relevance attributed to re-
lative neocortex size over other cerebral structures, 
as the psychological capacities involved in human 
sociality do not depend exclusively on the neocortex. 
Likewise, having displaced the focus from group size 
to social relationships and their network structure, the 
pursuit of “magic numbers” (5-15-50-150) in effective 
social configurations overlooks the vast diversity of 
human social life. Universals are not to be found in 
such simple group sizes, but in the motivation to form 
robust social bonds.
Similarly, Dunbar has become aware of the need 
to go beyond correlational analysis because com-
plex networks give rise to non-linear patterns. Thus, 
Dunbar has begun to resort to network analysis and 
to pay attention to trust networks. In this sense, 
Dávid-Barrett and Dunbar (2012), Dunbar (2012b), 
and Curry and Dunbar (2011) exemplify the interest 
of social network analysis, even if still in the service 
of finding “group constants”. The analysis of trust net-
works, however, is instrumental to better understand 
group cohesion (Acedo-Carmona and Gomila 2014). 
Moreover, although the SBH provides interesting 
elements on which to go on working, it becomes finally 
unsatisfactory because it does not contemplate that 
Figure 8.
Level of attainable intentionality (or theory of the advanced mind) for hominines populations respect to time 
(Dunbar 2003, p. 178).
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its functionalist explanation of the increase in relative 
brain size (achieving a selective advantage from li-
ving in larger groups) needs to be supplemented with 
a causal explanation of how this happened. In other 
words, the adaptive solution of the hominin linea-
ge remains incomplete: in a similar situation, many 
species chose adaptive routes other than increased 
brain size. But this point is not yet acknowledged, the 
functional explanation is viewed as sufficient: “large 
brains have arisen over evolutionary time as a res-
ponse to the social and ecological conflicts inherent 
in group living” (Shultz and Dunbar 2007) or: “prima-
tes evolved large brains to manage their unusually 
complex social systems” (Dunbar 2009a). These sta-
tements do not consider other highly social species 
that have not developed such cerebral and cognitive 
levels of development. In other words, even when the 
route of greater telencephalization could have been 
beneficial for many other species, they did not follow 
it. There are species that support severe environ-
mental pressures and must travel long distances to 
get food, such as ungulates, but such pressures did 
not force them to create more complex social sys-
tems to face these environmental challenges, ensure 
reproduction, or even protect their offspring.
In summary, from the analysis and review of 
Dunbar’s works, we can conclude that, although the 
SBH does not remain robustly established, its works 
on the evolution of human sociality and the cognitive 
mechanisms that made it possible open an interes-
ting route to be explored more thoroughly. In parti-
cular, closely examining small-scale human societies 
to compare them with large current human agglome-
rations is a timely goal for research in order to ca-
rry Dunbar’s program further. In other words, just as 
Dunbar tried to find evolutionary footprints in current 
social relationships, it would be equally interesting to 
determine whether there are social networks working 
as small-scale societies inside current complex so-
cieties, or whether social cohesion in both societies 
depends on a similar human motivation for social 
bonding. 
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